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Complexity in Decision Making:
The Case of the Rotterdam Harbour
Expansion. Connecting Decisions,
Arenas and Actors in Spatial Decision
Making
MARCEL VAN GILS* & ERIK-HANS KLIJN†
*Centre for Public Management, Erasmus University Rotterdam, The Netherlands; and Associated to
Port Authority Rotterdam; †Erasmus University Rotterdam and School of Public Policy, University of
Birmingham, UK
ABSTRACT Decision making about spatial projects is very complex. Decisions to develop the
Rotterdam harbour are taken in the context of a network of local, regional, national, European and
international actors, both public and private. These decision-making processes exhibit a lot of
complexity and the outcomes are of great importance for the development of the harbour. The
complexity is the consequence of interactions between actors connected in different arenas, who are
all thinking about the same project. This article uses network theory, and the concepts of actors and
arenas in particular, to highlight the complexity of decisions and the connections between various
separate decisions. It is demonstrated that the outcomes of the decision-making process are a result
of the various connections that are being made. The spatial project at the core of this article is a
harbour expansion project called Maasvlakte II.
Keywords: Decision making; network management; harbour expansion; complexity
Introduction
Decision making in the modern network society is complex. Decision processes take place
in networks of actors, who are tied by interdependencies in a society where resources and
knowledge are spread among a variety of actors (Castells, 1996; Healey, 2006; Kickert et al.,
1997). In addition, societal groups increasingly try to get involved in decision making,
which in turn makes the decision-making process even more complex. The history of the
expansion of Rotterdam harbour, (through the creation of the Maasvlakte II), illustrates
this complexity. It becomes apparent that in order to achieve satisfactory outcomes, it is
crucial to manage complexity in terms of actors, values and interactions
Twelve years have passed since the initiation of the decision-making process to expand
the Rotterdam harbour (1993). Until now we have witnessed a very complicated process
with many actors involved. Despite this, the main actors evaluated the decision-making
process as satisfactory. At the end of 2004, the atmosphere suddenly changed. The Council
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of State (Raad van State) rejected the project proposals because they believed research
about ecological aspects was lacking. The documents required for the juridical procedures
to implement the proposals (the so-called zoning procedure) that were almost ready have
since been adapted and updated. It is expected that it will take an additional one and a half
years to execute the restarted zoning-procedure.
This article uses a network perspective to analyse the complexity in the decision-making
process (see Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004). It analyses the nature of the complexity, focusing on
different actors and arenas involved in the decision-making process, and the way various
connections were made during its different rounds. In order to do this, the article describes
two separate rounds in the “game” to expand the harbour and compares them with each
other. The following question is asked: “How can we analyse complexity from a network
perspective and how can it aid us in explaining the outcomes of the decision-making
process to expand the Rotterdam harbour?”
The next section introduces the case for the expansion of Rotterdam harbour.
The following section outlines the theoretical perspective and introduces the concepts of
policy network, game, decisions and arenas. With these concepts, the article analyses the
decision-making process in the two most important decision-making rounds in the next
two sections. The analysis focuses on the intertwinement of different decisions, arenas and
networks. It is also demonstrated how decision making becomes dynamic through the
connection and disconnection of various decisions and arenas. It is shown how the
decision-making proceeds and stagnates because of different connections and the way
that these connections are being managed. The article concludes with some suggestions
for how to manage complexity in decision making.
Expanding the Port of Rotterdam: The Case
The harbour of Rotterdam is one of the main cargo junctions in the world. The central
location in Europe and the open access to the North Sea makes the harbour highly
accessible for all parts of the world. Approximately 450 million people live in the
hinterland of the port and the hinterland is now reaching towards the fast growing
economies of Central and Eastern Europe. Each year 30 000 sea-going vessels and 130 000
barges call at the harbour.
The Growth of Rotterdam Harbour
The harbour is situated in the southwest of the Netherlands and covers an area of
40 km (10 500 hectares) from the city centre to the Maasvlakte 1 along the Nieuwe
Waterweg canal.
From the end of the 1960s until some years ago the harbour was the biggest in the world.
Today the harbours of Singapore and Shanghai have higher throughput volumes. This
does not mean that the harbour has not been growing in recent years. Indeed, growth has
led to an increased demand for land for port activities. In addition to the demand, a second
interrelated factor can be observed. The main competitors of the Rotterdam harbour
are the other harbours in the North Western part of Europe: Antwerp and Hamburg.
Both ports have higher growth rates (from 1985–2005) than Rotterdam harbour, which has
increased pressure for Rotterdam to expand.
The growth of the harbour, the expected growth for the next decades, together with
the competitive pressure to grow, led to a strong demand for a new port expansion.
From the 1960s onwards the port steadily expanded westward (from the city centre to the
North Sea), with Maasvlakte 1 as the latest addition. The shaded part in the left side
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of Figure 1 identifies the plan for the Maasvlakte II. The decision-making process for this
port expansion plan is the object of study in this article.
In 1993, The Port Authority of Rotterdam (at that time a municipal organisation) and the
Dutch Ministry of Public Works, Transport and Water Management, introduced the spatial
project in the port plan 2010. It was embedded in the project of the ROM-Rijnmond
agreement.1 The actors involved introduced several alternatives:
(1) The Maasvlakte II: a new expansion of the harbour
(2) Optimising space in the existing harbour areas
(3) Harbour expansion in other port areas in the south-western part of the Netherlands
(for example, Vlissingen and Moerdijk).
The actors decided to create a project organisation to co-ordinate the decision-making
process. The Port Authority and the provincial part of the Ministry of Public Works,
Transport and Water Management co-ordinated this project organisation. One of the
first recommendations of the project organisation was to shift the lead to the Ministry.
The reasons given were that the project was of national interest, while the Port Authority
and provincial department could not generate sufficient financial means for realisation
(Weggeman, 2003).
With this decision the first of four rounds in the decision-making process came to an
end. The analysis in this article focuses on the second round (the interactive phase that
took place from 1996 until the end of 1997) and the third round (from 1998 to mid-2001).
The fourth round with the decision of the Council of State is described as a postscript
towards the end of the analysis.
A Network Perspective on Complexity
The network perspective assumes that policy is developed and implemented in networks
of organisations (Kickert et al., 1997. These policy networks can be defined as “more or less
stable patterns of social relations between mutually dependent actors, which form around
policy problems and/or clusters of means and which are formed. Maintained and changes
through series of games” (Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004, pp. 69–70). It could also be said that
these networks are complex systems of organisations.
Networks come into being and remain in existence because actors are dependent on
each other (Aldrich, 1979; Innes & Booher, 2004). Actors cannot achieve their objectives
Figure 1. The harbour of Rotterdam. Source: Port of Rotterdam Authority.
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without resources, and these are divided amongst many actors. Networks are thus
characterised by a limited substitutability of resources, which ensures that sustainable
social relations between actors are created (Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004). Thus power in a
network perspective is first connected to the resource division and asymmetry of the
dependency relations. Actors with more resources and with resources that are not
substitutable have more power (Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004; Scharpf, 1997).2
For a good understanding of a case such as the Maasvlakte II it is essential to note that
interactions around the decisions do not only take place within networks of organisations,
but that separate decisions are often situated in separate arenas. These arenas can be
situated in one network, but sometimes more arenas in different networks are involved,
thus enhancing complexity considerably. Complex environmental decisions, in particular,
are often characterised by a variety of (sector) decisions which most of the time are being
taken in different networks. The theoretical perspective and the notion of complexity in
policy interactions are elaborated below.
Arenas and Games: The Setting for Interaction
The game of problem solving in the decision-making process on Maasvlakte II takes place
in and between arenas.3 The actors present their strategies in one or more arenas. The arena
is the place or field where actors meet and interact. It is the place where a specific group of
actors make choices on the basis of their perceptions of problems and solutions (Cohen
et al., 1972). The evolution and outcomes of decision-making processes in policy networks
are determined to a large degree by the mix of strategies brought into the arena and the
interactions between arenas. An arena consists of a set of actors, a choice situation and
some more or less well-designed organisational arrangements (Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004).
Complexity: Strategic Actions of Players in Multiple Arenas
Policy games are complex not only because there are many players making unpredictable
strategic choices, but also because they are (often simultaneously) involved in more than
one arena. This is because most problems have different dimensions and thus touch upon
different types of policies and actors. For example, in decision making on harbour
expansion, issues such as transport, economy, employment, planning, noise and safety,
play a role. As a consequence, decisions about the future of the harbour are made in the
context of various types of policies, in various arenas, and at various government levels.
As a result, the policy game acquires a highly fragmented character with decisions being
made in different arenas at different levels and times.
More Complexity: The Relation to Other Games and Networks
The complexity of policy games is also enhanced because games are not played in a
vacuum, but amidst other games. Within an arena, actors can play more than one game.
As a consequence these games influence one another. A loss in one game can be
compensated by a gain in the other, or vice-versa. Different arenas play games to try to
couple their internal problem solving with problem-solving processes in other arenas.
Policy games thus influence each other. Through couplings, new trade-offs can be realised
between games. As a consequence, it is conceivable that in the one game support for
unpopular measures is created because there is compensation in another game.
Furthermore, coupling of games may have a mitigating effect upon the conflicts and
strategies that actors use. The costs for strategic misbehaviour in one game will have
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to be paid in another (Allison, 1971). Policy games will be even more complicated if they
occur in arenas that are situated in different networks.
It is not only difficult to connect the various interactions, but it is also likely that
different networks are characterised by different rules. This means that different rules are
used in arenas that are composed of actors and interaction activated from different
networks. This again increases the complexity of the game.
Outcomes of Policy Games: The Result of many Interactions
The evolution of policy games is a linear process where a problem is solved on the basis of
authoritative ex ante problem formulations or objectives. Policy games develop through a
series of successive decisions about the nature and content of a problem, about solutions,
and about how these matters are being decided. Just as there is no central decision maker,
there is no central decision. The policy game looks more like a simultaneously played
multiple chess game played in a number of rounds (Radford, 1977; Teisman, 1992). A round
opens with an initiative or policy intention of one of the parties that serves as “trigger” to the
others. What follows is a discussion between actors about what is to be done, what the
problem is and how this can be organised in a context that is often characterised by a lot of
ambiguity (March & Olsen, 1976). Through a series of steps, parties will then search for
mutual adaptation or joint solutions, not so much because they like each other but more
because they are forced to do this through their mutual dependencies.
Impasses and Breakthroughs
This process is certainly not without problems. Impasses can block achieving satisfactory
solutions for all parties. Impasses may emerge because actors are unwilling to invest in the
process (stagnation) or because there is a conflict where some actors use their veto power
(blockage). Impasses may eventually lead to terminating the policy discussion, but can
also result in a breakthrough. Breakthroughs and impasses can come about by crucial
decisions that reformulate the problem, conciliate opposing solutions or change the
group of those involved. Each round ends with a “crucial decision”, a decision that offers a
solution for the question that is central in the particular policy round. Crucial decisions
can be recognised because they frequently change the number of players, the nature of the
interactions or the content of the game (and mostly more than one of these). The content of
such a solution does not have to be the solution of a previous formulated problem. It can
also mean a redefinition of the original problem or a transposition of earlier positions and
objectives, so that the scope for solution is changed or enlarged. A crucial decision
heralds a new round or leads to a restart of earlier rounds. Thus, a “whole new ball game”
emerges with stakes, perceptions and strategies. Figure 2 visualises a policy game through
different rounds. The vertical axis provides the development of the content of plans,
the horizontal axis the development over time. The direction of the arrows indicates
the degree to which the process zigzags (substantively) and evolves by fits and starts
(in terms of time). The total policy game is composed of different games between actors in
the arena, between the arenas and between the rounds. Impasses and breakthroughs can
occur in all these games and sub-games.
Complexity and Explanations for Policy Processes
From a network perspective complexity is an inherent character of problem-solving and
decision-making processes. Complexity is the result of:
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. Various actors with different perceptions who each act strategically (and thus cannot be
predicted accurately, although knowledge of their position and perceptions gives some
idea of the range of their strategies).
. The interactions of different strategies of different actors within arenas.
. The interactions of various decisions made in different arenas within a policy round.
. The interactions of various decisions made in different arenas between policy rounds.
. The fact that interactions may occur in different arenas, which belong to different
networks, creates the possibility that different rules will be used and taken for granted
by involved actors.
Network theory provides a variety of explanations for reaching successful outcomes. Some of
these explanations can also be found in planning theory. They appear when the focus is upon
creating institutional or governance capacity in complex decision making (Healey, 1998, 2006;
Innes & Booher, 2003; Koppenjan & Klijn 2004). The most important explanations are:
. Positions of actors and their resource dependencies;
. Achieving interesting solutions that satisfy the various values at stake;
. Coupling of interactions of actors and arenas;
. Shared institutional structures (such as network rules);
. Systematic management efforts.
This article focuses specifically on three explanations for the success of outcomes in
decision making:
. The actor dynamics and positions;
. The activated arenas and flow of the decision-making process;
. The achieved couplings and managerial activities.
“Successful outcomes” refer to outcomes that:
. Generate support among many involved actors and of which actors are satisfied;
. Outcomes that are clearly developed in terms of content (this can be judged from the fact
that new ideas have been developed, by the fact that plans meet earlier criticism);
Figure 2. Flow of policy games: problem solving as a zigzag and erratic process. Source: Adapted
from Klijn et al. (2000)
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. Outcomes which have been realised through open processes where costs are not
transferred to other actors or networks.
Methodology
The reconstruction of the decision-making process of the extension of Rotterdam Port was
based on longitudinal research conducted over the years by various researchers within the
same research group at Erasmus University. Klijn studied the VERM extensively by means
of both participant observation and documents and interviews.4 The PMR decision
making was studied by Weggeman (Weggeman, 2003)5 and based on a detailed document
analysis and interviews of all the important stakeholders. For the reconstruction of the last
period, Van Gils made additional interviews.
The VERM-Round (1997–1998): Actors, Arenas and Interactions
In April 1996 the Cabinet decided to shift the responsibility for the project (Maasvlakte II) to
the Ministry of Public Works, Transport and Water Management. The first action
undertaken by the new ministerial project organisation was to start the VERM (Exploration
of the Spatial Need for Mainport Rotterdam). The VERM was meant to discuss the necessity
and urgency for the expansion of the harbour area. The crucial decision marking the end of
the round was to start the formal preparation of the zoning-procedure.6
At first a project team was created for the organisation of the interactive decision-
making process or open-plan process. This project organisation consisted of civil servants
from four departments (Public Works, Economic Affairs; Agriculture, Public Housing and
Zoning). In addition to the project team, various actors can be distinguished in the open
plan process (De Vries, 1997; Videler, 1997). The main actors involved in the round are
presented in Table 1.
Given the participation of various actors and the organisation of the process, it can be
concluded that there were two different games. On the one hand, there was the policy
game around the open plan process. This involved various actors interacting about the
question of whether there was lack of space in the Rotterdam harbour and how that could
be solved. It was conducted in three closely related arenas and a loosely linked arena: a
discussion arena with workshops and panels which were very open for all actors
(especially individual citizens); an expert arena parallel to the first and dominated by
expert meetings and research; and a condition arena where the conditions of the process
organisation and participation were discussed. The project team dominated the first two
arenas, which as network manager, linked decisions and arenas. The third, more loosely
linked arena was more a regular contact between project team and departments in which
national interest groups also participated. In these three arenas almost all of the actual
interaction between the various actors took place. For that reason they are called the
central arenas.7
In addition to the arenas in which the first game took place, there were two other
important arenas. First, there was the departmental arena, the initial decision arena, in
which the results of the VERM discussion were transformed into an initial decision
(the Cabinet decision was prepared in this arena before it went to parliament).
The Department of Public Works, Transport and Water Management was the most
important actor in this arena, but actors from other departments were also involved.
Second, there was a political arena for the political decision about the subsequent course of
action. The parliament and the ministers played a prominent role with the departments
in the background (see Table 2 for the most important arenas). In these two peripheral
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arenas the interactions took place after the VERM (Exploration Spatial Need for Mainport
Rotterdam) process had been finished. It can be seen that the departments (especially
Transport and Water management) held strong positions because they were both present
in the project organisation VERM and dominated the arenas in which further decisions
were taken and prepared, following from the interactive procedure. They also had strong
indispensable resources (authority and access to decision channels).
Interactions in and Between Central Arenas
There were varying degrees of intensity in interactions in and between the arenas.
The interactions in the condition arena can be considered as a meta-game for the actual
interactive process. At the beginning (mid-1997) it appeared that there was limited
support from the civil service for the open plan process. The Maasvlakte II project team
continued to co-exist with the VERM project team, and civil servants from various
departments continued to work on the development of the Maasvlakte II. This meant that
while they continued to work on one solution for the shortage of space in Rotterdam, they
were also discussing the nature and urgency of that problem and alternative solutions.
Some civil servants even questioned the open plan process that involved
“so many citizens”. They preferred a larger role for interest groups during the discussion.
At a meeting with the top civil servants of the Ministry of Public Works, Transport and
Water Management in September 1997, the question of whether the real problems had
emerged was explicitly raised. “Societal talk is not yet societal support” was the argument.
It was also made clear that the minister and members of parliament could not join in the
Table 1. Actors in the VERM round
Actors Characterisation Moments of
participation
Citizens Individual citizens Especially in the workshops and
the round table meetings
Interest groups
(economic)
Nationally organised economic interest
groups (labour unions, employers
organisations, Association of Dutch
chemical industry)
Especially in sounding board
group, also in national presentation,
the workshops
Interest groups
(environmental)
National and regional environmental
groups (Society for Nature and
Environment, World Nature Fund etc.)
Especially in sounding board
group. Modest participation in
workshops, round table groups
Regional administrators Mayors/Aldermen of municipalities and
counties involved; representatives and
directors of harbour companies
Dominant in consultant discussion,
amply represented in round table
meetings, more modest in
workshops
Experts/researchers Scholars/researchers with expertise in
relevant fields (regional economics,
public administration environment)
Especially in expert meetings.
Less intensive in sounding
board groups, workshops
National administrators Ministers Minimal involvement
Departments
(units and people
not in VERM)
Public Housing and Zoning; Public
Works, Transport and Water
Management, Finance; Economic
Affairs
Minimal involvement, but active
in interactions around VERM
Parliament Political parties Very limited participation
Source: Adapted from Klijn (2003).
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discussion because, it was argued, they had their own responsibilities. This meant that
the project decision might differ from the outcome of the discussion. Thus the
top civil servants of the ministry maintained the right to determine the project decision.
They refused to be bound by decisions in the interactive arenas in any way. This point of
view was repeated in subsequent discussions between the project team and the top civil
servants of various ministries. The open entry rules in the interaction arena conflicted with
the closed nature of the arenas outside the discussion. Formally the interaction arenas
were not a threat to the position and authority rules of ministries and politicians because
in the interactive arenas no final decisions could be made. The results of the interactions in
these arenas had only the status of advice and information. However, in practice they were
Table 2. Arenas in VERM
Arena Central actors Organisation and
linkages of
interactions in arena
Task/activities
Central arenas
1. Discussion arena Citizens, regional
politicians, regional
interest groups
(economic and
environmental)
Organisation: through
round table meetings,
workshops and sounding
board groups
Discussion about
nature of problem,
types of solutions,
interests etc.
Linkages: by project group
VERM
2. Expert arena Scholars, national interest
groups, CPB, Port Authority
Organisation: expert
meetings, sounding board
groups and research (CPB)
Reflection on
process and
substance,
development of
solutions
Linkages: by project
group VERM
3. Condition arena Project group VERM,
departments, monitoring
committee and
(sometimes) national
environmental organisations
Organisation: loosely
coupled
Discussion about
VERM design,
about types of
product, about
participation
Linkages: mostly initiative
of project group
Peripheral arenas
4. Initial decision
arena
Departments (Environment,
Economic Affairs,
Agriculture and Fisheries
and Public Works,
Transport and Water
Management), project
group VERM
Organisation: usual
interdepartmental
co-ordination mechanism
Preparing initial
decision for Cabinet
and parliament
(both substantively
and procedurally)
Linkages: through Public
Works, Transport and
Water Management
5. Political arena Second chamber,
Cabinet, departments
Organisation: usual
formal procedures
Political decision
and its preparation
(by Cabinet)
Source: Adapted from Klijn (2003).
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a threat because it is not easy for politicians and civil servants to neglect the results of the
interactive phases in which much time and energy has been invested. Indeed, politicians
and civil servants stress their own responsibilities at the beginning of the process precisely
because they seek to take away this pressure and modify expectations.
The environmental organisations were discontented with the design of the discussions
in the workshops and the round table meetings. They withdrew because they felt that the
real discussion about shortage of space had not taken place. Furthermore, they would
have liked the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) Committee to be involved
to ensure the substantive monitoring of the environmental objectives and the support for
them. Both the ministers of Traffic and Water Management and the monitoring
commission had signalled to the VERM project team that it was important for the
environmental organisations to stay involved. A meeting resulted in the decision to
ask the EIA Committee for advice and the formation of an extra sounding board
group. The environmental organisations were to have the opportunity to comment on the
structural policy of the Cabinet (strengthening the mainports of Rotterdam and Schiphol).
Toward the Crucial Decision: Interactions Outside the Central Arenas
On the basis of the findings from the open plan process, the project team advised the
Cabinet to construct a smaller Maasvlakte than initially proposed by the project group for
Maasvlakte II. For the time being, the Maasvlakte II should be about 500 ha “dry area”
(that is without harbour facilities) or 1000 ha with a direct link to water. A new nature area
of approximately 750 ha should also be developed. It can be observed that discussion on
shortage of space was already replaced by a discussion on the alternatives or even one of
the alternatives (Maasvlakte II kept dominating). The project group concluded that smart
“expansion solutions” were almost as expensive as the construction of a new area of some
2000 ha. This made the choice for a new area that respected nature values more obvious.
After the discussion in the open plan process, the preparation for the project decision was
returned to the departments. The final project decision conveyed the Cabinet’s point of
view that an economic growth of 3 per cent was necessary. This was to guarantee the goals
of sufficient growth of employment, and a well functioning Rotterdam port. According to
the Cabinet, research supported the idea that there was a lack of space for the mainport.
It proposed the initiation of a zoning procedure that would focus on land creation of about
1000 ha of contiguous harbour and industry area with its own access to the sea.
The possibility for the alternative of 500 ha dry area would also have to be investigated,
and future expansion should be possible. Furthermore, this procedure was to investigate
how the 750 ha of nature and recreation area could be realised. Striking resemblances can
be noted when the decision prepared by the Ministry of Transport is compared to the
original ideas of expansion (at the start of the interactive process). It can be deduced that
the new ideas and discussions that had been brought in by groups in the interactive phase
did not have much effect. There was also little reference made to the ideas in the
interactive process. In this respect the effects of the whole VERM interactive procedure
were disappointing (Klijn, 2003).
In December 1997, parliament discussed the proposal to initiate the zoning procedure.
The discussion was dominated by the question of whether there was enough material to
start this procedure. The minister assumed that expansion was necessary, but allowed
for the possibility that the zoning procedure could show otherwise. After discussion, all
motions to delay the zoning procedure were rejected. Only one motion of the Social
Democratic party, the PvdA (Social Democrats), was accepted. This motion indicated that
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the objectives of developing the mainport and improving liveability were equal, and that
the various alternatives with respect to such issues (i.e. required acreage, the balance
between private and public investments, the transport and environmental actions, and the
nature conservation area) were to be worked out simultaneously. The Cabinet parties of
D’66 (Liberal Democrats) and PvdA (Social Democrats) supported the motion primarily
because of their concern about the environmental component in the decision making.
The Cabinet party VVD (Conservative Liberals) supported the motion because it did not
want to be surprised by alternatives at a later stage, as had happened with a high speed
train decision. The decision to start the zoning procedure was the crucial decision that
marked the end of the VERM round.
The PMR Round (1998–2001): Actors, Arenas and Interactions
On the 14 July (1997), the Project Mainport Rotterdam was started. PMR was assigned two
main tasks, to research the alternatives for expansion and research, and describe the
influences on the quality of the surrounding living environment. PMR was organised by
the different governmental layers, together with the following public organisations: the
ministries of Public Works; Spatial Planning and Environment; Economic Affairs;
Agriculture, Natural Resources and Fisheries; and Finance. The province of South-
Holland, municipality of Rotterdam and the city-region of Rotterdam were also
incorporated in the project organisation. This project organisation was responsible for the
preparation of the zoning procedure that started at the end of 1997 (December
1997/January 1998).
In addition to all these public actors, many others were participating in this part of the
policy game (see Table 3). Societal groups, firms and intermediaries participated in
the Consultation Non-Public Actors (ONR).8 Some representatives of the PMR joined the
ONR regularly to relate the discussion made in the ONR to the public arena. This public
arena was called BOM9 (Public Consultation Mainports). The PMR project organisation
actors were mostly represented in the BOM. The BOM focused on public consultation
whereas the PMR was meant to co-ordinate between the arenas. In other words, the PMR
was the framework in which the interactions between the different arenas were
structured. This is why this round has been called the PM round. This does not mean that
the PMR project organisation stopped when this round ended.
The BOM (Public Consultation Mainports) and ONR (Consultation Non-Public Actors)
were the most central arenas in the PMR. Both arenas were connected by the
organisational arrangement called the Top Council10 (Top Beraad). The Vision and Heart
group also influenced the ONR and is described as an arena in which some actors were
actively participating. This short introduction is meant to clarify the different terms that
will be used in Table 3.
These actors functioned in five different arenas playing in two distinct games. On the
one hand there was the policy game in which the alternatives for harbour expansion were
discussed. This was done in two closely related arenas. The ONR-arena was characterised
by regular meetings in which the consequences of the different alternatives for expansion
were discussed. There was also the BOM arena, composed of the ministries, province and
municipality. Although the conditions of the process were discussed here, the focus was
also on possible alternatives.
An arena called Vision and Heart (Visie en Durf) developed parallel to the ONR. Three
environmental pressure groups worked together with the municipality of Rotterdam to
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discuss the environmental compensation measures developed in the port expansion
plans. This was a closely coupled arena.
The fourth and the fifth arena were loosely coupled. The fourth arena is called the
private-consultation arena. Parallel to the discussion of the alternatives, a group of private
firms was consulted to discuss possibilities for Public-Private Partnerships (PPP) for
the realisation of the alternatives. It is particularly striking that the discussion about the
PPP focused on the realisation of the Maasvlakte II. This indicates the ongoing dominance
of this alternative in the discussion.
The fifth was a political arena for the political decision about the subsequent course of
action. The parliament and the ministers played a prominent role in the latter stages of this
round and afterwards, but were absent in the earlier discussion. The five arenas are
indicated in Table 4. It was in and between these arenas that the transformation of the
discussion towards a decision took place.
Interactions in and Between the Central Arenas
There are varying degrees of intensity in interaction in and between the arenas. At first the
linkages within the ONR-arena were loosely coupled (from 1998 onwards). It was only
when the arena obtained a more prominent position (after formalisation in 2000) that the
discussions with the public organisations became more inter-connected. The BOM arena
was relatively well organised because it was linked very strongly to the actors in the
project organisation.
The dichotomy between the economic and environmental stakes was at the heart of the
discussion about the open plan process. The environmental groups expressed their
Table 3. Actors in the PMR round
Actors Characterisation Moments of participation
Interest groups
(economic)
Nationally organised economic interest
groups (labour unions, employers
organisations)
Especially in intern co-ordination
and partly in the regular sessions
of ONR.
Interest groups
(environmental)
National and regional environment
groups (Society for Nature and
Environment, Consept) Representatives
of Port Authority
Especially in ONR and partly in
Vision and Heart. Discussion
about incorporation
of environmental values
Regional
administrators
Mayors/Aldermen of municipalities
and provinces involved; and the
association of Water Boards
Especially in Public Consultation
Mainports (BOM)
and some separately in Vision and
Heart
Project
co-ordinators
Project organisation PMR and individuals
(Hans Alders/Roel in ‘t Veld)
Active in and between different
structures, like in ONR, between
ONR and BOM
National
administrators
Ministers Minimal involvement, until latter
stages of PMR Round
Mixed interest
groups
For example, the Automobile
Drivers Association, intermediaries
Incorporated in ONR, representing
mixed values.
Departments Public Housing and Zoning; Public
Works, Finance; Economic Affairs
Involvement in Public Consultation
Mainports and informing the ministers
Parliament Political parties (national level) Very limited participation, in approval of
zoning procedure
Source: Adapted from Weggeman (2003).
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feelings of misrepresentation regularly and the tension between economic and
environmental interests dominated the decision making. This tension was captured
by the formalisation of the ONR at the beginning of 2000. The agreement was quite
unique, in the sense that it was the first time environmental interest groups received such a
strong position in decision making, and offered the potential for balancing the economic
and environmental stakes. But soon after the start of the ONR the tension became more
pertinent once again. The environmental stakeholders wanted to leave the ONR because
they felt neglected. Instead of joint fact-finding, the environmental groups felt that they
could only react to the facts. The environmental groups were also unhappy about the
communication and indicated that their recommendations did not reach the minister at all
(Weggeman, 2003).11
The civil servants working and thinking together in the BOM were rather hesitant of the
open plan process again. They continued with the preparation of the plans for the
Table 4. Arenas in the PMR round
Arena Central actors Organisation
and linkages
of interactions
in arena
Task/activities
Central arenas
1. ONR (Consultation
non-public actors)
arena (formalised
in 2000)
Interest groups
(economic and
environmental)
Organisation: through
monthly meetings
Discussion about
alternatives,
representation
of interests
Linkages: by ONR
2. BOM (Consultation
Public Actors) Arena
National, provincial
and local public
stakeholders
Organisation: through
regular meetings
Reflection on
process and
substance.
Discussion on
alternatives.
Linkages: by BOM
Peripheral arenas
3. Vision and Heart Interest Groups
(mainly environmental)
organized to discuss
environmental aspects
more prominently than
in ONR
Organisation:
regular meetings
Discussion about
how to incorporate
environmental
aspects in
expansion of
harbour
Linkages: via Municipality
of Rotterdam
4. PPP arena Firms and Ministry of
Public Works, Transport
and Water Management
Organisation: some
meetings
Thinking about
possibilities for
Public-Private
Partnerships
Linkages: by project
organisation
5. Political arena Parliament, Cabinet,
departments
Organisation: minister Political decision
and preparation
(by Cabinet)
Linkages: BOM/Topberaad
Source: Adapted from Weggeman (2003).
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Maasvlakte II and this led in turn to the resistance of the ONR. They wanted a joint
decision-making process to consider the choice of one of the alternatives for the expansion
of the Rotterdam harbour.
Under the lead of a mediator, Hans Alders, the stakeholders were brought to talking
terms again. The main action was the evaluation of the ONR. The evaluation resulted in a
recommendation to the minister in which Alders indicated that a Top Council could be a
solution for the negative feelings of the different stakeholders. This Top Council was
composed of representatives of large interest groups (ONR and BOM). The environmental
stakeholders remained negative about the chances. They wanted full participation in the
dialogue about the options for creating additional space for port activities. The document
PMR on Course (Koers) at the end of 1999 fed the negative feelings again, because the
option of expanding the port in the South Western part of Holland was described as
impossible. The environmental stakeholders refused to sign the process covenant.
The environmental groups even left the ONR again. The stakeholders directly reacted to a
letter in a Dutch newspaper (NRC) in which the scientific board of the PMR indicated
there was no justified reason why the third option was seen as impossible to realise.
An advisor In ‘t Veld was approached to resolve the impasse. He indicated trust should be
re-won to bring the stakeholders closer again. The minister asked Alders again to mediate.
Finally, there was agreement on a new style for the (formalised) ONR in which the ONR
could play a more active role and advise the minister more directly. This advice was the
result of a process in which joint fact-finding was placed more centrally. The ONR
(Consultation Non-Public Actors) was located beside the BOM (Consultation Public Actors)
in the Top Council and has a new direct link and consultation to the minister of Public Works.
Interactions in the Peripheral Arenas
Some of the actors did not actively participate in the first policy game. At first it was these
actors who were disappointed about the openness of the plan process. Some environmental
interest groups decided to leave the discussion arena because they felt their stakes were not
represented strongly in the discussion. These stakeholders finally returned partly in the
ONR, after the ONR obtained a more central role in the interaction process at the beginning
of 2000. Meanwhile, at the end of 1999, the municipality of Rotterdam invited three
environmental interest groups (Consept, Natuurmonumenten and the Society for Nature
and Environment) to discuss the incorporation of the environmental stakes (the 750 ha
compensation). In June 2000 the actors recommended that this arena should be called Vision
and Heart. This arena was known to the actors in the ONR and influenced the outcomes of
the ONR discussion indirectly. The publication of the recommendation some weeks before
the official advice of the ONR did create some tensions, but these have not had a divisive
influence on the stakeholders in the ONR. This is called a peripheral arena, because the
actors could only reach the final decision makers via the ONR.
The second peripheral arena was loosely coupled and did not participate actively.
It involved the initiative to explore the possibilities for private contributions to the financing
of the project. This economic arena was founded to search for financing options for the
Maasvlakte II. This arena represented the economic stake and expected the Maasvlakte II to
be realised. In other words, they were already preparing the execution of the project. This
indicates that the doubts of the environmental interest groups about the real choice between
the alternatives can be seen as justified. The political arena was relatively absent in this
round, only the minister was regularly informed by the Top Council and project
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organisation and received recommendations from the BOM and ONR arena. The same
applies for the parliament, which only judged the zoning procedure after completion.
Towards the Crucial Decision in the Political Arena
The crucial decision taken in this round was the choice to favour the Maasvlakte II as the
solution to the problem of lack of space for the expansion of the Port of Rotterdam. The
minister and the parliament finally made this decision. The preparation of the zoning
procedure was made in consultation with ONR and BOM. The linkages between the political
arena and the ONR arena were intensified in the Top Council as a consequence of this crucial
decision. It was laid down in the zoning procedure document part 1, which was sent to the
parliament on the 11 July 2001.In this document the contents of the plan were described.
Complexity in Expanding Rotterdam Harbour: Outcomes, Arenas and Actors
This section looks at the dynamics and complexity of the decision-making process.
The focus is on the VERM (Exploration Spatial Need Mainport) and PMR rounds
(Project Mainport Rotterdam). First, the achieved outcomes in each of these two rounds
are compared and an attempt will be made to find some explanations for the differences.
Outcomes of the VERM and PMR Round
If the achieved outcomes of the two most important decision-making rounds in the game
around the expansion of the Rotterdam Harbour are compared, some striking differences
can be found. In general, the evaluation of the outcomes of the PMR round was more
positive compared to the evaluation of the VERM round. The number of actors that were
satisfied with the decision is higher in PMR than in VERM. Although the VERM process
was very open at the core (the interactive process), this openness of the process was not
present in the final stage of the VERM where the decision was being prepared for
parliament. The PMR process was mainly open for well-organised interest groups, but less
so for individual citizens.
It can be said that in the PMR round a real intertwinement of goals was achieved
(Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004). The achieved solutions were inclusive in the sense that they
satisfied various values at stake, and were reasonably enriched so that actors were
satisfied. Alternatively, in the VERM process no real enrichment was achieved and only a
few actors were satisfied. The outcomes could also be framed in a slightly different way
(but with the same result). In the VERM round the initial decision to choose expansion
rather than other options (such as better use of existing space) was not challenged. In the
PMR round hard negotiations took place to receive various types of compensations for the
environmental losses of the extension solution. The achieved compensation resulted in a
relatively high satisfaction with groups that were not satisfied in the previous round.
An overview of the evaluation of the outcomes can be found in Table 5 (the dimensions are
derived from the theory in second paragraph).
An interesting question is how to explain the differences in outcomes of the two
rounds. As explained in the second section, the answer must include an examination of
actor dynamics and positions, the activating and de-activating of arenas and the
management efforts.
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Actor Dynamics and Positions in the VERM and PMR Rounds
Looking at the actor analysis of the two rounds, only a limited number of differences in the
actors and involvement in the two decision rounds can be found. Most of the actors
involved in one round were also involved in the other round. The main difference was the
strong involvement of individual citizens, but not well-organised interest groups in
the VERM (due to the interactive character of the process). These were largely absent in the
PMR round, where more intermediary actors were involved. They had a better position in
the PMR round because their chance to give legitimacy to the process increased through the
parliamentary decision that there should be more attention to both the economic aspects
(expanding the port) and to the environmental aspects (benefits for the environment).
There was also a difference in the way non-public actors (mainly societal interest groups)
were tied to the decision-making process. In the PMR round the influence of the non-
governmental actors was more secure than in the VERM round, or to put it another way, the
level of participation was more intense. The stronger position of environmental groups
and the more intense level of interactions created a stronger interdependency between the
actors and a need to combine ideas and develop solutions that satisfied various actors
(Weggeman, 2003). This cannot be seen apart from the presence of some intermediary actors
in the PMR round. It seems that the PMR round was better designed for interaction.
The Flow of Decision Making: Activating and De-activating Arenas
After the round in which the project was initiated, the decision-making process expanded
strongly in the VERM round. Many actors entered the game and more different arenas
were created and/or activated. Compared to the initial round, it could be said that the
game expanded enormously in the second round. Every round had its activated arenas
Table 5. Outcomes in the VERM en PMR round
Dimension VERM PMR
Satisfaction
of actors
(þ/2 , 2) Satisfaction rather low
with environmental groups, and
individual citizens, reasonable with
economic interest groups, mixed
feelings in parliament, reasonable
satisfaction with departments
(þ) In general relatively high satisfaction
with all actors that have been present in the
process (environmental and economic
interest groups, public actors) Very satisfied
parliament
Enrichment (þ/2 , 2 ) Limited enrichment.
Much information was only available
at the end of the process. The
proposal at the end did not differ
much from the beginning of the
process and the argumentation did
not always refer to the findings of the
process (or sometimes even conflicts
with it)
(þ , þ /2) Some interesting ideas to
combine economic development with
environmental values (compensation).
Not necessarily new ideas but making
the combinations was essential
Process (openness,
participation)
(þ/2) The VERM process itself was
very open and with participation of
a wide variety of actors, the
decision-making after the organised
VERM process within the
department was however rather
closed
(þ/2 , þ ) Limited open process (mainly
accessible to organised interest groups but
not for individual citizens or less well
organized interest groups)
Conclusion (þ/2 , 2): Involvement of many
actors but a lot of dissatisfaction
and limited enrichment
þ Reasonable involvement, many
satisfaction with actors a good enrichment
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(and by implication its activated actors), and each arena had its own temporarily
constructed organisational arrangements. Just as the VERM round had its special
organisational arrangements (organised by the project bureau VERM), the PMR round
(as The Top Council) had its own arrangements. Identifying the arenas makes it possible to
observe the expansion (or contraction!) of the decision-making process and thus analyse
the nature of the complexity.
The arenas in both rounds were relatively similar. The only difference was that the
discussion of the VERM took place in two separate arenas, while in the PMR, the ONR and
BOM arena came together in the Top Council. It is striking that the discussion arena in the
VERM had relatively little influence on the crucial decision whereas the ONR, BOM and
Vision and Heart arena in the PMR influenced the political arena in direct (advising
minister) (BOM/ONR) and indirect ways (advising minister via ONR). The active
discussion arena of the VERM round split up in two or three arenas in the PMR. The project
organisation (condition arena in VERM) changed into an intermediary mitigating actor
binding the three other arenas. The political arena only changed internally and was as
active in both rounds, but had more influence in the PMR round. The expert and initiating
arenas of the VERM were incorporated more or less in the other arenas in the PMR. These
switches of arenas illustrated the dynamic character of the policy game. In the first round
only the departments and the port authority were active as initiators. During the VERM
and PMR round, arenas became active and then de-activated again. The dynamics were
high but the linkages between the arenas particularly grew in the PMR round. After the
PMR round, to a large extent the policy game lost its dynamics.
Managing the Connections: A Multitask Job
As the two rounds are compared, it can first be observed that the connections between the
different arenas and decisions were better in the PMR phase. The political actors
(both ministers and members of parliament) were better connected to the other decisions
in the PMR compared to the VERM case, which showed a rather sharp demarcation
between the open interactive phase of the round and the departmental and political
decision making afterwards (Klijn, 2003).
The job of managing the interactions in the decision-making process is not the job of one
actor. In the VERM round the study found at least two network managers who took care of
managing (part of) the interactions: the project group VERM and the Ministry of
Transport. The latter actor only managed the procedure of preparing the proposal for the
parliament. For the PMR the project organisation PMR was one of the managers. This is
the only actor which participated in BOM and ONR and coupled some results. The same
goes for in ‘t Veld and especially Alders. His management of the process combined the
public wish to incorporate the non-public actors in the plan process. In short, it can
be concluded that the network management activities in the PMR round were more
intensive and were aimed more at connecting actors and arenas than in the VERM round.
This is certainly an important part of the explanation of the greater success of the PMR
round (see Table 6).
Postscript: After the PMR-Round, Unforeseen Impasse
The provision of the first part of the zoning-procedure to the parliament in July 2001
marked the start of a political process. In this round the Cabinet proposals were discussed
in the parliament and were open for public consultation. The discussion on, and the
preparation of the second, third and fourth part took some time (until mid-2003).
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Meanwhile, the Top Council was regularly informed and asked for recommendations, but
no real interactions occurred
From 30 September 2003 until 30 November organisations and individuals were able to
object to the concrete decisions laid down in the fourth part of the zoning documents.
Twenty-six objections were made by different individuals (farmers, fishermen) and
organisations (people of Oostvoorne, Concept). All these objections were dealt with, some
were rejected, some approved. This was followed by the final decision of the Council of
State who expressed doubts about some environmental aspects (such as the transport of
plankton, Gulf Stream flows along the Dutch coast). These doubts led them to reject the
fourth part of the zoning document.
This does not mean the whole process of interaction has to be redone. Only the final part
of the zoning procedure will start again. The zoning procedure documents have to be
changed, according to the guidelines of the Council of State and new objections can then
be produced. The Council of State will then decide again whether the project can be
approved or not.
If an analysis is made of the grounds on which the Council of State based its rejection,
some interesting explanations can be identified. First, many of the objections came from
actors who were largely neglected in the process: farmers and fishermen. Second,
objections of the farmers and fishermen were related to the compensation measures taken
in the project. Since the interaction between the actors and arenas in the second and third
round, the compensation of 750 ha of natural areas was incorporated. This second project
raised some doubts with some fishermen, and especially the farmers, and eventually
resulted in the objections. It can be seen that although the decision on the Maasvlakte II
was widened to achieve a win-win situation in the conflict economy-environment, at the
same time this sparked a new game in which environmental conservation had to be
weighted against fishery and farmer interests. This new game also activated new and
other networks, which had not been present before. To this extent, it can be said that
increasing complexity solves complexity and results in new complexity: an interesting
paradox
Conclusions
This article has analysed two rounds of a complex decision-making process and their
outcomes. First, the complexity in the policy process was identified. This was done using
concepts from network theory (actors, arenas and interactions). After that an attempt was
made to identify factors that contributed to the potential successful outcomes of the
complex decision-making game. The conclusion was that the better outcomes of the PMR
round compared to the VERM round could be attributed to the stronger position of
environmental groups in the second PMR round. It was also the consequence of the better
Table 6. Network managers and network management activities in VERM and PMR round
Round Managers Activities
VERM Project bureau VERM (VERM arenas)
Ministry of Transport (for the initial
decision arena)
VERM project group: co-ordinating interactions,
organising research/information process
PMR PMR project bureau individuals ONR PMR project organisation, joining discussion
in BOM and ONR. Managing process between
non-public and public actors
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network management activities that were performed. To conclude, some observations
about these complex processes are presented.
Complexity as Paradox
The size of projects such as the Maasvlakte II, and the impact of the project on many actors,
makes them complex. As the article has shown, the policy game surrounding the
Maasvlakte II is composed of different actors and arenas. The decision making expanded
from the first round to the second round, due to the involvement of more actors and arenas
and shrank again in the fourth round. This analysis of the games and arenas makes it
possible to picture the complexity of decision making, and gives an image of who and
what is connected in decision making.
Interestingly, this complexity also allows for solutions which cannot be achieved
without the complexity. Since the problems and the value conflicts that are tied to
solutions are of themselves complex, it is only through the involvement of many actors
and resources that a satisfactory solution becomes possible. It is increasing complexity
(including more actors and arenas) that makes it possible to achieve solutions that are
acceptable to all actors. However, the PMR round illustrated that this is far from an easy
job. The conflicts between actors and their values are a constant tension in the process,
which has to be managed very carefully. As many authors point out such processes are
energy- and time-consuming (Innes & Booher, 2003; Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004).
The Interaction Process Cannot Guarantee Successful Outcomes
The interactive character of the policy game, although laborious, gave the policy process a
relative smooth character. As Weggeman has argued, the Maasvlakte II is a good example
of a typical Dutch interactive decision-making model (Weggeman, 2003). Important for the
managerial effort are the efforts to connect arenas and actors, which here are called
strategic management or managing the interactions. The ONR, BOM, VERM and
Top Council were examples of arrangements with interactive powers that were intensively
managed. In addition the interesting content of the project seems to be crucial for the
interaction process. The possibility to change the contents during the process (enrichment)
and in that way to interest and satisfy various actors is important.
The rejection of the zoning procedure of the Council of State seemed to be a complete
surprise. It was observed that this rejection was due to actors not intensively connected to
the decision-making process. It provides two lessons. One is that even well-guided
interactions can enhance the changes for success, but it cannot guarantee it. The complex
character of interactions in networks always can cause surprises. The second lesson is that
expanding the range of decision making by including new arenas (as new policy issues)
can also affect new actors who want to be involved in the decision-making process. There
was not enough anticipation of this in the managerial efforts.
Creating Positions and Incentives to Interact
The final interesting observation is that the PMR round was also successful because the
interdependencies between actors represented different values (economic and environ-
mental values). When these tensions are stronger it gives the process more incentives to
search for new interesting solutions, or at least interesting compensations. The dominance
of actors who favour the expansion, and the limited connection of the interactive decision-
making phase to powerful actors and existing institutional arrangements, prevented this
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in the first VERM round. In particular, politically elected officials can create these
incentives and can thereby have more impact on decision making than they normally
have.
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Notes
1. In the period in which the Port Plan 2010 was prepared, the public organisations (national level, provincial
and local) and some private actors were organised in the ROM-Rijnmond. This covenant for Spatial Planning
and Environment was meant to research an integrated framework for a sustainable spatial policy in the
Rijnmond Area (the area in which the port of Rotterdam is mainly situated).
2. Power is also connected to the existing rules of the network, which give some actors more access or authority
or prevent certain topics. This is the famous invisible side of power (for a detailed examination, see
Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004).
3. The word game is used here in the same sense as other public administration scholars (Allison, 1971) and
sociologists (Crozier & Friedberg, 1980) and not in the rational formal sense of game theory. Although
interesting connections have been made between network theory and game theory (Scharpf, 1997), the
empirical relevance of a limited number of game types is limited. The word game here is a concept (as it is
with Allison) to indicate the dynamics of the interactions and the idea that outcomes are a result of actors and
their positions, strategies and the interaction of strategies (see Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004).
4. Klijn participated in some of the meetings and two of his masters degree students were actively involved in
the organisation of the VERM process (see Videler, 1997; De Vries, 1997). This enabled an inside view into the
whole process (see also Klijn, 2003).
5. The case was part of PHD research on deliberate forms of governance in The Netherlands.
6. Zoning procedure is a free translation of the Dutch term “PKB” (Planologische Kernbeslissing) or Spatial
Core Decision in English. The PKB is a zoning document (made in several steps) on which spatial decisions
are based and find their legal basis.
7. The concepts central and peripheral thus refer to the density of interactions in the game.
8. Consultation Non-Public Actors will be named ONR (Overleg Niet Rijkspartijen in Dutch) in the remainder
of this article. The ONR is the forum where the non-public actors met each other and discussed the
alternatives of port expansion and tried to make their advice heard among the ministers and within the
departments. The ONR was formalised in 2000.
9. Public Consultation Mainports will be named BOM (Bestuurlijk Overleg Mainports) in this article. The BOM
was the forum in which the public actors met each other and discussed the alternatives of the harbour
expansion. They were directly linked to the departments and ministers.
10. The Top Council (Top Beraad in Dutch), was an organisational arrangement, which was directly linked to the
minister of Water management, Transport and Public Works. In the early years of this round, only the BOM
was directly linked, later on the ONR was incorporated as well.
11. See also an interview in 2005 with a member of the project team on the Maasvlakte II within the Port
Authority in Rotterdam.
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